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THE USE OF MARITIME ATTACHMENT AS A
JURISDICTIONAL DEVICE
A federal district court hearing an admiralty claim may assert jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant by attaching any of his property found
within the district in which the court sits.1 Two district courts recently con-
sidered the first direct constitutional attacks launched against such quasi in
rem admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of the jurisdictional due process
standard of Shaffer v. Heitner.2 Although both courts upheld the constitu-
tionality of such jurisdiction, the apparent unanimity of result masked
deeply conflicting approaches to the issues raised. In Grand Bahama Petro-
leum Co. v. Canadian Transortation Agencies, Ltd,3 the court held that the
Shaffer standard does not apply to maritime attachment at all because of
admiralty's unique history, subject matter, and procedures. 4 In contrast,
1. Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplemental Rules for Certain Ad-
miralty and Maritime Claims, outlines the procedure for obtaining such jurisdiction. This
Note deals with quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction based on a Rule B attachment. No conclu-
sion is intended as to in rem admiralty jurisdiction, which is governed by Rule C of the Sup-
plemental Rules. See Bohmann, Appicability of Shaffer to Admiralty In Rem Jurisdiction, 53
TUL. L. REv. 135 (1978).
2. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978) (Beeks, J.). This opinion served, without further
analysis, as one of four grounds of decision in Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nation-
ale Algerienne de Navigation, 459 F. Supp. 1242, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
4. The defendant in Grand Bahama also attacked the attachment successfully on proce-
dural due process grounds, Le., lack ofjudicial control over the seizure process under Rule B.
This Note, however, focuses only on jurisdictional due process attacks on maritime attach-
ment. Treatment of the procedural due process attacks can be found in Grand Bahama, 450 F.
Supp. at 456-59; 7A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, I E.10, at E-451 to 456 (2d ed. 1978); Note,
Due Process inAdmiraltyArrest and Attachment, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1091 (1978); Note, Maritime
Attachment andArrest: Facing a Jurisdictional and Procedural Due Process Attack, 35 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 153 (1978). The success of the procedural due process attack does not make the
jurisdictional issue moot. First, relatively minor changes in the procedure of maritime attach-
ment will probably suffice to satisfy procedural due process requirements. See Grand Bahama,
450 F. Supp. at 459 n.84; Note, Maritime Attachment Under Rule B: A Jurisdictional Disguise
for an Unconstitutional Security Attachment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REy. 403, 429 (1977); Note,
supra, 56 TEx. L. REV. at 1113-15; Note, supra, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 169-71. Second, a
member of the Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Maritime Law Association who
was in Judge Beeks's chambers while the Grand Bahama opinion was discussed flatly stated
afterward that "foreign attachment or process of maritime attachment as it is now being called
under Rule B is still available. It has not become unavailable under this decision ......
COMMITrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MARITIME LAW AssOCIATION OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT 6903 (1978) (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Maritime Law Associa-
tion, May 5, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 MLA REPORT].
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the court in Engineering Equpment Co. v. S.S. Selene5 held that although
the Shaffer standard does apply to Rule B attachments, the quasi in rem
jurisdiction thus created can meet that standard. These conflicting deci-
sions reveal the current uncertainty as to the status of maritime attachment
under today's jurisdictional due process standard.6
In particular, these decisions raise two important issues. First, should
the constitutional standard of jurisdictional due process enunciated in
Shaffer, which evolved in a common law context, be applicable to admi-
ralty actions, which are traditionally an entirely separate "head" of federal
jurisdiction? If the separations between these branches of federal jurisdic-
tion remain sufficiently strong, as the Grand Bahama court concluded, this
standard should not be applicable. Such a result would leave the status of
maritime attachment as a jurisdictional device unaffected by Shaffer. But
if, as this Note will urge, the Shaffer standard should be applicable to quasi
in rem admiralty jurisdiction, a second issue arises: what changes must be
made to enable maritime attachment to comply with this standard? This
Note will address these issues by focusing on the recent district court deci-
sions in Grand Bahama and Selene. First, the Note will present relevant
background material. Then the inquiry will shift to a consideration of the
threshold question of the applicability of the Shaffer standard, dealt'with in
Grand Bahama. The Note will then examine how the Selene court found
the Shaffer standard satisfied. Finally, the focus will broaden to a discus-
sion of the ramifications of the application of the Shaffer standard to admi-
ralty cases as a class.7
I
THE BACKGROUND
A. RULE B
Maritime attachment, as a means of vesting a court with personal juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant, developed in the early days of the
general maritime law long before the U.S. Constitution came into being.8
5. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
6. See 7A MOORE'S, supra note 4, E. 10, at E-451 to 460; Note, supra note 4, 56 TEX. L.
REv. 1091; Note, supra note 4, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 153; COMMI'rEE ON PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, MARITIME LAW ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SECOND SPECIAL RE-
PORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ON THE ADMIRALTY ARREST AND
ATTACHMENT RULES 6637-44 (1977) (presented at the Fall Meeting of the Maritime Law As-
sociation, Nov. 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 MLA REPORT].
7. Under the "saving to suitors" clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976), certain in personam
maritime claims may also be brought in state courts. As this Note focuses on federal admiralty
jurisdiction, those cases are beyond its scope.
8. Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 489-91 (1825).
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The great distances between the mobile parties involved in an admiralty
action necessitated a procedure that would permit the speedy and effective
resolution of disputes. The writ of foreign attachment, the ancestor of the
procedure now codified in Rule B,9 served two important interests of these
parties.
First, a need existed to minimize delay in the resolution of such dis-
putes so as to avoid interrupting the flow of commerce and to prevent the
defendant from removing himself and his property from the locale in which
the plaintiff sought to bring suit. 10 Attachment served this purpose by
freezing the asset attached, thereby preventing its removal and forcing its
owner to respond to the plaintiff's claim in order to secure its release. Sec-
ond, admiralty courts had to assure the claimant of a forum that did not
involve such a degree of expense or inconvenience as to effectively deny
him redress. " Without the mechanism of attachment, the defendant could
easily remove himself and his property from the territorial jurisdiction of
the court in which the plaintiff had filed a claim and safely assume that the
aggrieved party would not travel to the defendant's residence to institute in
personam proceedings. 12
This procedure remained essentially unchanged by its incorporation
into American admiralty practice and its subsequent codifications. 13 To-
day, this procedure is set out in Rule B, which outlines the steps that a party
seeking an attachment must take.' 4 The Rule requires that process of at-
9. Id. at 490; see 7A MOORE'S, supra note 4, 1 B.02, at B-51.
10. "Courts of admiralty have been found necessary in all commercial countries, .. for
the safety and convenience of commerce, and the speedy decision of controversies, where delay
would often be ruin. ... The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851).
11. To compel suitors in admiralty.., to resort to the home of the defendant, and to
prevent them from suing him in any district in which he might be served with a sum-
mons or his goods or credits attached, would not only often put them to great delay,
inconvenience and expense, but would in many cases amount to a denial of'justice.
In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1890).
12. When appropriate, arrest of the vessel and an in rem action can serve the same pur-
pose as attachment. In rem jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Note, however, and no
conclusion as to maritime arrest is intended here. See Bohmann, supra note 1.
13. With minor changes, Rule B is virtually identical to Rule 2 of the Admiralty Rules of
1844 and its successor, Rule 2 of the Admiralty Rules of 1920. For the texts of these rules, see
7A MOORE'S, supra note 4, $ .30, at 223-24. As Professor Moore points out, the identity be-
tween the three sets of rules means that there have been no major changes in the process of
maritime attachment from 1825 to the present. Id, B.02, at B-54. The changes that have
occurred deal with the scope of judicial participation in the attachment proceeding itself and
thus are relevant to a discussion of procedural, not jurisdictional, due process. See 450 F.
Supp. at 459.
14. The Rule provides, in relevant part:
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified complaint
may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and chattels, or cred-
its and effects in the hands of garnishees named in the complaint to the amount sued
1979]
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tachment and garnishment will issue only if the defendant "shall not be
found within the district" where the plaintiff fies his claim.' 5 The Advisory
Committee in drafting the Rule expressly declined to define this limiting
phrase, leaving this task to the courts. 16 Judicial interpretation has pro-
duced a universally accepted two-pronged test to define when a defendant
may be "found within the district."' 17 This test is essentially a negative test
in that failure of either prong permits an attachment to issue.
The first-prong inquires "whether or not the [defendant] is present
within the district by reason of activities on [his] behalf by authorized
agents so as to subject [him] to this Court's jurisdiction in in personam pro-
ceedings."' 8 In this appraisal of the defendant's activities, the standard is
that of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.19 When the activities are in-
sufficient to meet this standard, the defendant fails the first prong, the in-
quiry ends, and the attachment will be upheld. If, however, this standard is
met, the second prong becomes relevant.
This prong examines whether the defendant "can be found within the
district with due diligence for service in the . . . proceeding."'20 Satisfac-
tion of this prong will occur only when the court finds that an agent or
officer of the defendant corporation, or an individual defendant himself, is
subject to service of process within the district.21 If both prongs can be
satisfied, the court will hold that the defendant can be "found within the
district" contrary to the requirement of Rule B and will vacate the attach-
ment. But failure to satisfy either prong will permit the attachment to
stand.
It should be emphasized that, despite the language in Rule B limiting
its scope to claims brought "in personam, ' 22 the Rule is in fact a classic
example of quasi in rem jurisdiction since the defendant is reached solely
for, if the defendant shall not be found within the district. Such a complaint shall be
accompanied by an affidavit signed by the plaintiff or his attorney that, to the affiant's
knowledge, or to the best of his information and belief, the defendant cannot be found
within the district. When a verified complaint is supported by such an affidavit the
clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and process of attachment and garnishment.
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(l) [hereinafter cited as Rule B].
15. Id. This phrase can be construed as emphasizing the jurisdictional aspect of Rule B
rather than its security aspect. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. at 429.16. Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule B, reprinted in 7A MooRE's, supra note 4,
B.01[2], at B-12.
17. See United States v. Cia. Naviera Continental S.A., 178 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
cited in Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule B, reprinted in 7A MOORE'S, Supra note 4,
B.01[2], at B-12.
18. 178 F. Supp. at 563 (footnote omitted).
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See notes 28-32 infra and accompanying text.
20. 178 F. Supp. at 564.
21. Id.
22. See note 14 suplra.
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through his property located within the court's territorial jurisdiction.23 It
is this creation of quasi in rein jurisdiction that necessitates consideration of
the Shaffer decision. 24
B. SHAFFER AND QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION
Shaffer25 marked the virtual end of the "territoriality" or "power" the-
ory ofjurisdiction advanced in Pennoyer v. Neff.26 The Court explained the
collapse of the Pennoyer doctrine in the area of in personam jurisdiction
and its replacement by the minimum contacts/reasonableness standard of
International Shoe.27 The test under that due process standard is whether
23. Quasi in rem jurisdiction exists when "the jurisdiction of the court is based on power
over a thing and the effect of the judgment is to affect interests of particular persons in a
thing." RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS at 8 (1942). See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. E (designat-
ing an action based on a maritime attachment as quasi in rem); Maryland Tuna Corp. v. MS
Benares, 429 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1970); East Asiatic Co. v. Indomar, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 1335
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
24. One other complication of the jurisdictional situation created by invoking Rule B
should be noted. By limiting service of process of attachment and garnishment to the territo-
rial confines of the district, FED. R. Civ. P. SupP. R. E (3)(a), but allowing for statewide service
of process under Rule 4(f), the drafters of Rule B enabled some admiralty plaintiffs to choose
between proceeding in personam or quasi in rem. The Advisory Committee noted this overlap
of jurisdiction but offered no solution:
The effect is to enlarge the class of cases in which the plaintiff may proceed by attach-
ment or garnishment although jurisdiction of the person of the defendant may be in-
dependently obtained. This is possible at the present time where, for example, a
corporate defendant has appointed an agent within the district to accept service of
process but is not carrying on activities there sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction [i.e.
failing the first prong of the two-pronged test]. . . or where, though the foreign corpo-
ration's activities in the district are sufficient to subject it personally to the jurisdiction,
there is in the district no officer on whom process can be served [i.e. failing the second
.prong of the two-pronged test] ....
Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule B, reprinted in 7A MOORE'S, supra note 4, 1 B.0112], at
B-12 (citations omitted). Although the utility of such overlapping jurisdiction has been criti-
cized, see, e.g., D/S A/S Flint v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 228 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), a2 9'd
sub nom. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1965); Note, supra note 4, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 403, this issue is relevant to the present
discussion only insofar as it affects two interests considered in the Shaffer due process analysis:
the plaintiffs interest in obtaining a forum and the forum's interest in providing one. In the
overlap situations, both interests are of less force in sustaining quasi in rem jurisdiction than in
the situation in which only quasi in rem jurisdiction is possible.
25. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The issue in Shaffer was the constitutionality
of the exercise by Delaware state courts of quasi in rem jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants whose only contacts with that state were their positions as shareholders and officers in a
Delaware corporation. Id at 189. Plaintiff contended that the defendants' stock holdings,
whose situs under Delaware law was within that state regardless of where the certificates were
or where the corporation conducted its business, could serve as the basis of quasi in rem juris-
diction over these defendants by virtue of Delaware's sequestration statute.
26. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
27. 433 U.S. at 196-205 (discussing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)).
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there are "such contacts of the [defendant] with the ... forum as to make it
reasonable. . to require the defendant to defend the particular suit which
is brought there."28 This inquiry focuses on "the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation" 29 and can be broken down into
two factors: the level of the defendant's activities within the territorial con-
fines of the forum and the relationship between these activities and the
claim being litigated.30 A "continuous and systematic" course of activity
will enable the court to assert jurisdiction over a claim that is comparatively
unrelated to that activity, whereas activity within the forum confined to "a
single or isolated" act will not.3 1 In contrast, when the claim arises from
precisely that single or isolated act, in personam jurisdiction can be exer-
cised over the defendant if, on balancing the interests of the plaintiff, de-
fendant, and forum, such jurisdiction would be reasonable.3 2
After outlining the evolution of this jurisdictional due process test
within the confines of in personam jurisdiction, the Court announced the
extension of the test to other types ofjurisdiction. Rejecting the traditional
idea that in rem and quasi in rem proceedings are aimed at property rather
than at the owners of that property,33 the Court held that "all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny. ' 34 This expansion of the
breadth of the constitutional standard probably will have little effect on in
rem and certain quasi in rem actions35 since, as the Court noted, "when
claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy
between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State
where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. '3 6 But the Court also
noted that "cases where the property which now serves as the basis for
state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of ac-
28. 326 U.S. at 317.
29. 433 U.S. at 204.
30. 326 U.S. at 318.
31. Id at 317.
32. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The precise scope
of the reasonableness component of this jurisdictional due process test is unclear, but the re-
peated references to "reasonableness" in Shafer imply that it plays a role in the test. See
Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Over Foreigners, 12 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 67, 69-70 (1979).
33. 433 U.S. at 205.
34. Id at 212 (footnote omitted).
35. The Shaffer Court distinguished between the two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction:
In one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and
to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In
the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the de-
fendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
Id at 199 n.17 (citation omitted).
36. Id at 207 (footnote omitted). This characterization would include in rem actions and
the first type of quasi in rem action defined in note 35 supra.
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tion"'37 would be significantly affected by the imposition of the minimum
contacts/reasonableness test.3 8 The implication is clear: the availability of
this type of quasi in rem jurisdiction will be sharply curtailed under the
Shaffer test.39
Two other aspects of the Shaffer decision are relevant to this Note's
analysis. First, the Court carefully pointed out that it was not considering
"the question whether the presence of a defendant's property in the State is
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the
plaintiff."' 40 This statement implies that such situations, denoted "jurisdic-
tion by necessity," might well be outside the scope of the holding.41 The
concept could be important to admiralty litigation. For example, an Ameri-
can shipper could argue jurisdiction by necessity where quasi in rem juris-
diction is based on a Rule B attachment of property found within the
district if the property belongs to an alien shipowner who has no other con-
tacts with the United States.
Second, Justice Stevens's concurrence 42 in the Shaffer decision may
illuminate the application of the decision. Taking a broad view of the ma-
jority opinion, he asserted that certain activities within the forum by a non-
resident defendant can still serve as constitutional bases for jurisdiction
when contacts are minimal:
If I visit another State, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I
knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my
property or my person while there. My contact with the State, though mini-
mal, gives rise to predictable risks. 3
The possible effect of this concurring opinion is illustrated by Feder v.
Turkish Airlines,44 a post-Shaffer case that challenged the constitutionality
of nonmaritime quasi in rem jurisdiction over an alien defendant based on
the attachment of the defendant's bank account. The court relied on Justice
Stevens's concurrence to uphold the constitutionality of this jurisdiction.
Finding, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the account
37. Id at 208-09. This category is composed of the second type of quasi in rem action
defined in note 35 supra.
38. The "minimum contacts/reasonableness test" will hereinafter be termed the Shaffer
test.
39. See 433 U.S. at 209. In point of fact, the Shaffer Court applied this test to the facts
before it and, reversing the Delaware Supreme Court, held that no quasi in rem jurisdiction
could constitutionally be asserted over defendants who lacked minimum contacts with Dela-
ware. Id
40. Id at 211 n.37.
41. See Note, supra note 32, at 75 n.45 (commenting that jurisdiction by necessity does not
fall outside the scope of Shaffer but instead meets the Shaffer standard).
42. 433 U.S. at 217-19.
43. Id at 218.
44. 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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was purposefully opened by the defendant, and concluding that the risk of
litigation concerning that account was foreseeable and predictable, the
court held that the Shaffer test was satisfied. 45 Since bank accounts are
often the subject of maritime attachments, 46 Feder may be analogous to
admiralty actions. But this does not answer the question of how Shaffer,
concerned exclusively with nonmaritime matters and state court jurisdic-
tion, will affect maritime attachment.
C. SHAFFER AND RULE B
Ordinarily, a case so far removed from admiralty matters as Shaffer
would provoke little reaction from the admiralty bar. But a number of fac-
tors associated with that case led many commentators to consider its effect
on admiralty law in general and maritime attachment in particular. 47 First,
the seemingly broad reasoning of the Shaffer Court, though not specifically
addressed to admiralty matters, can easily be read to include them within
its constitutional argument. Second, the theoretical and practical similari-
ties between the Delaware sequestration statute and Rule B are clear.48
Third, the Court clearly stated that its decision would seriously restrict the
availability of the second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction,49 and it is this
type of quasi in rem jurisdiction that many Rule B attachments create.50
After an examination of these factors, some commentators concluded
that the jurisdictional due process standard of Shaffer must be considered
in evaluating the constitutionality of jurisdiction based on a maritime at-
45. Specifically, the court held:
The voluntary opening by [defendant] of a bank account... satisfies the "minimum
contacts" of International Shoe, as well as that requirement of foreseability imparted
by Shaffer into quasi in rem actions: the concept, that is to say, that the nonresident
owner has undertaken acts with respect to the attached property which placed him on
notice of the possibility of his having to defend such property in the foreign forum.
Id at 1278-79 (footnote omitted).
46. See, e.g., Federazione Italiana dei Consorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania de Vapores,
S.A., 158 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
47. See sources cited in notes 4 & 6 suora; 1977 MLA REPORT, supra note 6, at 6774-86.
48. "Sequestration is the equity counterpart of the process of foreign attachment in suits at
law . . . . Delaware's sequestration statute was modeled after its attachment statute." 433
U.S. at 194 n.10. The identity in form between the sequestration statute involved in Shaffer
and Rule B is clear. The Shaffer Court accepted the determination by the Delaware Supreme
Court that the purpose of the sequestration statute was "to compel the appearance of the de-
fendant." 433 U.S. at 194. Similarly, the "primary object" of maritime attachment is "to com-
pel appearance." Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 489 (1825). This similarity has
een noted by the commentators. See, e.g., 7A MOORE'S, supra note 4, E.10, at E-456; 4
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, § 3-B.4, at 3-108.8 to .10 (7th ed. rev. 1977).
49. See note 35 supra.
50. See 7A MOORE'S, supra note 4, 1 E. 10, at E-459. All of the cases discussed in this Note
involve the second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction desribed by the Shaffer Court. See note 35
suprao
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tachment, but they disagreed as to whether quasi in rem admiralty jurisdic-
tion satisfied the Shaffer test.5 ' Although most believed that such
jurisdiction could not meet the constitutional requirements, the only court
directly to address this issue held otherwise.52
In contrast, the court in Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian
Transportation Agencies, Ltd,53 after analyzing the origins of Rule B at-
tachment and the Shaffer jurisdictional due process standard, concluded
that this standard should not determine the constitutionality of quasi in rem
jurisdiction based on a Rule B attachment. This question of Shaffer's ap-
plicability to admiralty attachments is a threshold question because, if it
does not apply, satisfaction of the Shaffer test would be irrelevant.
II
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SHAFFER TEST
TO ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION:
GRAND BAHAMA
It is important to realize that the Grand Bahama54 court's considera-
tion of the impact of Shaffer on quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction began
and ended with the issue of applicability. As the court viewed it, the ques-
tion was not how the Shaffer due process standard affected admiralty juris-
diction, but whether there was such an effect at all. Thus, the court framed
the issue as whether the Shaffer standard should be carried over into admi-
ralty, which the court viewed as an independent and autonomous branch of
federal jurisdiction. Transplanting this standard from one branch of juris-
diction to the other could be justified only by a conclusion that the indepen-
dence of these categories had eroded to the point where the same
constitutional standard should apply to both. The court focused its atten-
tion on the validity of such a conclusion.
The plaintiff, a Bahamian corporation, claimed that the defendant, a
Canadian corporation, failed to make payments for fuel delivered and serv-
ices rendered to the defendant's vessel at the plaintiffs fueling facility in the
Bahamas.55 To recover this amount, the plaintiff filed a claim in admiralty
and, pursuant to Rule B, attached a bank account in the defendant's name
within the district. 56 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court's exercise of the quasi in rem jurisdiction thus created
51. For citations to these works, see notes 4 & 6 supra.
52. Engineering Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
53. 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
54. Id
55. Id at 449.
56. Id
1979]
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violated the fifth amendment due process clause as recently interpreted by
Shafer,57 since the required minimum contacts among the defendant, fo-
rum, and litigation were lacking.58
The court noted that the creation of quasi in rem jurisdiction over an
admiralty claim through a Rule B attachment "bears some similarity to
Shafer.'5 9 But, focusing on the issue of applicability, the court reviewed
the history of admiralty law and maritime attachment from practical, con-
stitutional, and statutory perspectives and concluded that admiralty began
as, developed as, and remained a component of American jurisprudence
independent from the common law within which the Shafer standard
arose. Judge Beeks stated that "[t]he recognized autonomy of admiralty
jurisprudence, although not absolute, and the long constitutional viability
of maritime attachment compel me to conclude that Shaffer does not reach
Rule B(l) attachment."' 60 On the strength of this conclusion, the court re-
fused to apply the Shaffer test to the facts before it and rejected the jurisdic-
tional due process attack on its exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 6 t
The conclusion that common law standards do not apply to admiralty
is based on the historical development of maritime law. Maritime law arose
as an uncodified form of customary international law among shippers, ship-
owners, and seamen outside the confines of common law and national legal
systems. Early systematization and codification followed a Roman or civil
law basis.62 Thus, general maritime law and its procedure of attachment, as
incorporated into American jurisprudence, were not within the scope of the
common law that eventually produced the Shafer decision. Although the
GrandBahama court was justified in adopting this idea as the fountainhead
of its analysis, closer examination of the practical, constitutional, and statu-
tory arguments raised by that court undercuts the validity of its conclu-
sion.63
57. Shaffer construed the fourteenth amendment due process clause. According to most
commentators, the fifth amendment imposes identical standards. See 446 F. Supp. at 709 n.10
and cases cited therein. But see 1977 MLA REPORT, supra note 6, at 6780 (suggesting that the
fifth amendment standard requires "a somewhat lower level of defendant contacts" than that
of the fourteenth amendment).
58. 450 F. Supp. at 449. The defendant also based his motion to dismiss on the ground
that the procedure by which the attachment was made pursuant to Rule B violated procedural
due process and was successful on that ground. That topic, however, is beyond the scope of
this Note. See note 4 supra.
59. 450 F. Supp. at 452 (footnotes omitted).
60. Id at 455.
61. Id at 456.
62. For general accounts of the development of maritime law, see 1 BENEDICT ON ADMI-
RALTY, supra note 48, chs. I-VI; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 3-11 (2d
ed. 1975).
63. Since this Note is concerned only with quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction, none of the
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A. THE PRACTICAL ARGUMENT
To the Grand Bahama court, the independence of admiralty jurisdic-
tion and by implication the inapplicability of the Shaffer test to matters
within that jurisdiction "derived from the maritime context in which admi-
ralty is set. Admiralty deals with circumstances generally different froiia
those of the common law."64 In support of this contention, the court
quoted five of these distinctive "circumstances" from an early United States
Supreme Court opinion.65 The first two concern the nature of the parties to
an admiralty claim, who "may be absent from their homes for long periods
of time" and "often have property or credits in other places."66 The next
two address the need for a speedy resolution of controversies between such
parties, so as to "least hinder or detain men from their employments" and
to avoid delay "where delay would often be ruin."67 The fifth, previously
alluded to, is the need to assure the claimant of a forum through the use of
an attachment or in rem remedy to prevent "great delay, inconvenience and
expense, [which] would in many cases amount to a denial of justice." 68
When the general maritime law developed, most commercial transac-
tions spanning long distances involved carriage by ship. The distances in-
volved and the mobile nature of the parties and property concerned were
unique to admiralty and required unique procedures to aid in the resolution
of disputes. In this context of practical necessity, the procedure of maritime
attachment evolved in approximately its present form.69 But the persist-
ence of this traditional procedure obscured great changes in commerce.
Transactions between distant parties were increasingly conducted by non-
maritime means such as road, rail, air, and even electronic transfer. Lands-
men invaded the positions formerly occupied solely by shippers and
shipowners. Like maritime parties, these landsmen often owned property
in other places and their businesses required the speedy resolution of
whatever disputes might otherwise interrupt their trade. Conversely, the
shipping trade became increasingly dominated by corporations, entities
which are never "absent from their homes for long periods of time." 70 Fi-
nally, the need'to assure the claimant of a forum when the defendant is an
arguments presented in the following subsections should be read in the context of substantive
admiralty law or in rem admiralty jurisdiction.
64. 450 F. Supp. at 453.
65. In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488 (1890); see notes 10-11 supra and accom-
panying text.
66. 450 F. Supp. at 453 (quoting 134 U.S. at 493).
67. Id
68. Id
69. See notes 8-13 supra and accompanying text.
70. 134 U.S. at 493.
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alien became as strongly felt in nonmaritime situations as in traditional ad-
miralty cases.71
Therefore, the nature and functions of the two groups have become so
similar in today's economy that it cannot truly be said that they deal with
different circumstances. 72 Given these similarities and the analogy between
Rule B and attachment statutes,73 subjecting landsmen, but not maritime
parties, to the limitations of the Shaffer test can no longer be justified on the
ground of practical necessity. Rather, the Shaffer jurisdictional due process
standard should apply to both groups.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
A second argument advanced by the Grand Bahama court in favor of
the inapplicability of the Shaffer standard to admiralty matters rested on
the phraseology of the Constitution.74 On its face, article III of the Consti-
tution contains two separate grants of jurisdiction to the federal judiciary:
one over "all Cases, in Law and Equity" and the other over "all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.175 Because of this separation within
the Constitution, the Grand Bahama court refused to relax the barriers be-
tween the two spheres of jurisdiction and concluded that these barriers
should prevent application of the common law jurisdictional due process
standard to admiralty cases. To buttress this stance, the court cited 130
years of constitutional interpretation preserving this constitutional separa-
tion76 in at least some contexts.77
As absolute as the distinction between common law and admiralty may
appear on the face of the Constitution, three factors undercut its importance
today. First, given the Framers' knowledge of the civil law, rather than
common law, origin of maritime law,78 the text of article III can be seen as
simply a restatement of the fact of this independent development rather
than a directive for the future. Second, recent judicial pronouncements
have rejected the contention that this constitutional distinction is so frozen
71. See Note, supra note 32.
72. But see note 63 supra.
73. See note 48 supra.
74. 450 F. Supp. at 453 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2).
75. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
76. The Supreme Court held in 1828 that "[t]he Constitution certainly contemplates these
as ... distinct classes of cases .... The discrimination made between them, in the Constitu-
tion is, we think, conclusive against their identity." American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 511, 545 (1828). As late as 1959, the Court reaffirmed this position by stating that "'all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction' . ... are not 'Cases, in Law and Equity,
.... .. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 368 (1959).
77. The issue in these cases was the availability of a jury trial in admiralty actions.
78. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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in time as to be exempt from change in the modem era.79 Third, the
merger of procedural rules, first of common law and equity in 1938, and
then of common law/equity and admiralty in 1966, has further eroded the
concept of a rigidly separate admiralty jurisdiction. Taken together, the last
two factors indicate that the independence of admiralty jurisdiction from
common law has diminished to the point that common law jurisdictional
due process standards should be applied in admiralty cases. The third fac-
tor, not discussed by the Grand Bahama court, is further analyzed below.
C. THE PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT
As the Grand Bahama court noted,80 the early Process Acts unequivo-
cally provided that the federal district courts should draw their "forms and
modes of proceedings" in admiralty actions from the civil law rather than
the common law.8' This distinction between common law and admiralty
procedures reflected the constitutional separation of the two branches of
jurisdiction and supported the court's conclusion that standards developed
in the context of one branch were inapplicable to actions within the scope of
the other. But the passage of time has undermined the autonomous begin-
nings of admiralty procedure. Although the United States Supreme Court
twice adopted procedural rules applicable only to admiralty actions,82 these
were replaced by the unified Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966.83
The very existence of this unified set of Rules, governing procedure in what
were formerly common law, equity, and admiralty actions, indicates the
erosion of the independence of these classes of jurisdiction and undercuts
the reasoning of the Grand Bahama court. Proponents of that decision may,
however, raise two arguments to uphold its reasoning.
First, the existence within the Federal Rules of a set of Supplemental
Rules applicable only to admiralty and maritime claims8 4 could support the
assertion that the two branches ofjurisdiction are still separate for procedu-
79. The historic fact is that prior to and since the adoption of the Constitution various
principles, rules and procedures have been characteristic of admiralty. . . . But the
Constitutional vesting of admiralty jurisdiction in the district courts did not require
the perpetuation of all historically characteristic principles, rules and practices of ad-
miralty ....
Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264, 265 (3d Cir. 1969) (citations omitted).
80. 450 F. Supp. at 453-54.
81. An Act to Regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States, ch. XXI, I Stat. 93
(1789); An Act for regulating Processes in the Courts of the United States, ch. XXXVI, 1 Stat.
275 (1792). As the titles indicate, these acts were purely procedural in scope.
82. See note 13 supra.
83. 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966). The current version of the Federal Rules may be found following
Title 28 of the U.S. Code.
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. A-F.
1979]
342 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURN4L [Vol. 12:329
ral purposes. Even the members of the Advisory Committee recognized the
continuing need for some procedural separation, viewing their goal in 1966
as "not total a priori uniformity, but a single simplified set of rules to dis-
pose of most of the practical problems of procedure in both civil and admi-
ralty cases." 85 Yet the overwhelming degree of uniformity achieved by the
Advisory Committee's replacement of more than fifty Admiralty Rules with
only six Supplemental Rules and fifteen amendments to the Civil Rules
8 6
represents a balance heavily weighted against procedural separation. On
the face of the 1966 merger, then, the procedural separation between com-
mon law and admiralty actions has been- substantially lessened, undercut-
ting the distinction drawn between the two in the Process Acts upon which
the Grand Bahama court relied.
Second, supporters of the Grand Bahama decision could argue that the
post-1966 case law reflects considerable uncertainty about conflicts between
traditional admiralty procedure and the mandate of unification. But an ex-
amination of three procedural aspects ofjurisdictional boundaries-joinder
of parties,87 joinder of claims,88 and impleader 89 -illustrates the basic
85. Colby, Admiralty Unofcation, 54 GEo. LJ. 1258, 1259 (1966).
86. 7A MooRE's, supra note 4, 1 .01, at 10.
87. Although under traditional admiralty practice "parties whose claims or liabilities were
based on legal or equitable grounds could not be joined with parties whose claims or liabilities
were based on maritime grounds," permissive joinder "is consistent with the broad goals of
unification." 7A MooRn's, supra note 4, .57[2], at 409. The leading post-unification case
allowed such joinder, although the opinion ignored the problems raised by trying the claim
against the nonmaritime party to the court rather than to a jury. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S.
Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). Contra, Howmet Corp. v. Tokyo Shipping Co., 320
F. Supp. 975 (D. Del. 1971).
88. Federal Rule 18(a) was amended in 1966 specifically to expand its scope to include
admiralty actions. Professor Moore notes the effect of this change on the traditional admiralty
practice:
In admiralty, there could, generally, be no joinder of maritime and non-maritime
claims. Nor was it certain that there could be a joinder of completely independent
causes not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. . . .Rule 18(a) now
makes clear that joinder of all the claims. . . within the scope of the Civil Rules is
proper.7A MOORE'S, supra note 4, %.56[3], at 406-07 (footnotes omitted). The leading post-unification
case allowed the joinder of an equitable and a maritime claim. Beverly Hills Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Compania de Navegacione Almirante, S.A., Pan., 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 996 (1971); accord, Ohio Barge Line, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863(W.D. Pa. 1971).
89. Impleader is the area in which unification has been least successful, largely because
Federal Rule 14(c) retained the traditional admiralty practice of allowing the impleading of
parties liable directly to the plaintiff ("substitute defendants"). Under the traditional practice,
jurisdiction would not be extended over any third-party claim that did not have an independ-
ent basis of federal jurisdiction, with some courts requiring this to be admiralty jurisdiction.
Aktieselskabet Fido v. Lloyd Braziliero, 283 F. 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 737 (1922);
David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-Ship Co., 223 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The leading
post-unification case, citing the binding nature of this traditional approach and jury trial
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dominance of the policy of unification, although problems remain in the
areas of impleader and the seventh amendment right to a jury trial.90 On
the basis of the success of the 1938 merger of the procedures of law and
equity, this uncertainty can best be attributed to the present period of tran-
sition. Judging by the movement of the courts to date, the 1966 merger will
grow in strength and scope, further lessening the current separation be-
tween common law and admiralty procedure.
On the whole, the Grand Bahama court's conclusion that the practical,
constitutional, and procedural distinctions between common law and admi-
ralty require a different jurisdictional due process standard in each class of
jurisdiction does not appear well founded. By framing the issue as one of
transferring such a standard from one type of jurisdiction to the other, the
court necessitated a consideration of the extent to which, for the purposes of
jurisdictional due process, the two classes are indeed separate. Close analy-
sis reveals that this separation has eroded over time so that it should not bar
the applicability of the Shaffer test to quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction.
This conclusion shifts the inquiry to a consideration of how a Rule B at-
tachment might pass that test.
problems, followed these cases and refused to take jurisdiction of a party impleaded on a
nonfederal and nonmaritime claim. McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex.
1968); accord, Bernard v. United States Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973). Contra,
Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970). For a more detailed examination
of the post-unification case law in these three areas, see Landers, By Sleight of Rule: Admiralty
Unification andAncillary andPendent Jurisdiction, 51 TEx. L. REv. 50 (1972); Robertson, Ad-
miralty Procedure and Jurisdiction After the 1966 Unfication, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1628 (1976);
Comment, 28 Sw. L.J. 1021 (1974); Comment, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 594; Comment, 81 YALE L.J.
1154 (1972).
90. Although the seventh amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in common law
actions, no such guarantee has ever existed in admiralty. Thus, post-unification courts are
reluctant to try actions combining maritime and common law claims to a jury, but they cannot
deny the seventh amendment right of a nonmaritime joined or impleaded party, or one joined
on a nonmaritime claim. Two solutions are available, although to date little use has been
made of either. First, the United States Supreme Court's conclusion that the nonjury tradition
in admiralty cases has no basis in either the Constitution or the federal statutes could be inter-
preted to allow a nonmaritime party's seventh amendment right to override any admiralty
tradition. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21 (1962). Second, split trials,
with part of a case tried before a judge and the remainder before a jury, could be used more
extensively. Fawcett v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 519 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Oroco
Marine, Inc. v. National Marine Service, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 220 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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III
THE APPLICATION OF THE SHAFFER TEST TO
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION: SELENE
A. APPLYING THE SHAFFER TEST
In Engineering Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene," the court did not even
consider the question of the applicability of Shaffer to the facts before it.
Thus it implicitly answered the threshold applicability question in the af-
firmative and applied the Shaffer test. This case is important to the present
analysis because it represents the first judicial application of the Shaffer test
to the evaluation of the constitutionality of quasi in rem jurisdiction based
on a Rule B attachment.
Selene involved American corporations that filed a claim against the
defendants, Italian and Monegasque corporations, to recover for damage to
and misdelivery of cargo transported from Philadelphia on the defendants'
ship.92 The plaintiff sought to amend its complaint to request Rule B at-
tachment of debts allegedly owed to the defendants by their own local
agents who operated within the district in which the court sat. 93 The de-
fendants contended that "their lack of contacts with the forum state [New
York] preclude[d] [the] assertion of jurisdiction" over them under the Shaf-
fer test.94
The court applied the Shaffer test but made two significant modifica-
tions. First, recognizing that Rule B is an act of Congress 9s creating federal
jurisdiction, the court found that the relevant due process standard was that
of the fifth amendment rather than the fourteenth.96 Second, on the basis
of the federal nature of admiralty jurisdiction and by analogy to federal
question jurisdiction, the court concluded that "[tjhe relevant constitutional
inquiry under the Fifth Amendment is whether the defendants have mini-
mum contacts with the United States as a whole sufficient to make our asser-
tion of jurisdiction fair and reasonable uhder the circumstances." '97 Using
this analysis, the court aggregated the contacts between the defendants and
all parts of the United States to arrive at a total to be used in the Shaffer
test.
91. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
92. Id at 708.
93. Id
94. Id at 709.
95. The 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules, including the entire set of Supplemental
Rules, were approved by Congress on Nov. 6, 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-773, 80 Stat. 1323 (1966).
96. See note 57 supra.
97. 446 F. Supp. at 709 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
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B. SATISFYING THE SH.4FFER TEST
The Selene court found that the facts before it satisfied the modified
Shaffer test in two ways. First, the court focused on the relhtionship be-
tween the level of the defendants' activities within the United States and the
claim being litigated.98 Even after aggregation, the defendants' activities
consisted primarily of entering the port of Philadelphia for the purpose of
shipping the plaintiffs goods.99 Although this activity must be classified
under the Shaffer analysis as "single or isolated" rather than "continuous
and systematic,"'100 the plaintiffs claim arose from precisely that activity.
This relationship sufficed to pass the Shaffer test and to allow the Selene
court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendants in accordance with the
Shaffer standard.10
The Selene court also found satisfaction of the Shaffer test on the basis
of Justice Stevens's concurrence in the latter case.10 2 Relying on the Feder
court's interpretation of that concurrence, 10 3 the Selene court considered
the question of whether the defendants could reasonably have foreseen that
litigation concerning the property now attached for jurisdictional purposes
could take place in the United States. ° 4 The court reasoned that the pres-
ence of this property-the charter hire owed to the defendants by their
agents for the shipment of plaintiffs goods-in the United States was "by
no means fortuitous."'10 5 This conclusion seems self-evident since the debt
arose out of deliberate contract negotiations between the agents and the
plaintiff. But the court went on to find that since the contracts required at
least partial performance in the United States, the prospect of U.S. litiga-
tion concerning the obligations created by these contracts was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendants.10 6 Using the United States as the forum, the
98. This relationship is the core of the Shaffer test. See notes 28-32 supra and accompany-
ing text.
99. 446 F. Supp. at 710. These defendants appear to have engaged in only one other
activity within the United States--the filing of a claim in the same district court to recover the
debt owed them on this same contract by their agents. Id
100. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
101. Id The Selene court restated this aspect of the Shaffer test in holding that "[t]his
single act [of entering the United States to load the plaintiffs' cargo] is itself a constitutionally
sufficient basis for jurisdiction at least where, as here, the plaintiffs' claims for cargo damage
and misdelivery arise out of that act." 446 F. Supp. at 710 (footnote omitted).
102. 446 F. Supp. at 710 n.17; see notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
104. 446 F. Supp. at 710.
105. Id
106. Id To bolster this conclusion concerning foreseeability, the court needed only to
point out that "the defendants themselves invoked this court's jurisdiction as plaintiffs in their
attempts to recover the charter hire." Id
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foreseeability of litigation concerning property that the defendants had
placed within the forum met the Shaffer test as interpreted in Feder.10 7
IV
THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ATTACHMENT
AS A JURISDICTIONAL DEVICE
Selene presents a case in which quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction
based on a Rule B attachment was held to satisfy the Shaffer test. This
result alone is sufficient to make the decision of considerable interest, but its
real importance lies in the questions it raises in applying the Shaffer test to
admiralty cases. Three issues are of particular concern: the fate of the two-
pronged test presently used to determine the validity of a Rule B attach-
ment; the proper forum to be used when applying the Shaffer test to admi-
ralty cases; and the means by which the Shaffer test may be satisfied in
other admiralty cases.
A. ADAPTING THE Two-PRONGED TEST
District courts hearing admiralty claims developed the two-pronged
test as a gloss on Rule B's requirement that process of attachment and gar-
nishment can issue only if the defendant "shall not be found within the
district" in which the plaintiff files his claim. The test consists of a "juris-
dictional" prong asking whether the defendant's activities within the district
satisfy the minimum contacts test, and a "service" prong inquiring whether
the defendant can be found within the district for service of process. Fail-
ure to satisfy either prong permits a valid attachment.'0 8 The following
discussion will assume that the "service" prong can be satisfied by the de-
fendant.
If the defendant fails to satisfy the "jurisdictional" prong because he
lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the district, an attachment will be
valid under the present two-pronged test. But the Shaffer standard clearly
requires the existence of minimum contacts in order for a valid attachment
to issue, although the proper locus of these contacts is not clear. Thus, after
Shaffer, when a defendant fails the "jurisdictional" prong, the inquiry can
no longer end in a valid Rule B attachment. Rather, the court must then
apply the Shaffer test to determine whether sufficient minimum contacts
exist between the defendant and the proper forum' 0 9 to make an attach-
107. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
108. For a more extensive discussion of this two-pronged test, see notes 15-21 supra and
accompanying text.
109. See text accompanying notes 110-30 infra.
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ment constitutionally permissible. If such contacts do not exist, no attach-
ment may issue under the Shaffer standard even though the old two-
pronged test might have permitted such an attachment. Therefore, in situa-
tions like the one discussed above, applying the Shaffer test to quasi in rem
admiralty jurisdiction will restrict the availability of such jurisdiction.
B. THE PROPER FORUM FOR USE IN THE SHAFFER TEST
The core of the minimum contacts aspect of the Shaffer test is the eval-
uation of the level of the defendant's activities within the forum and the
relationship between those activities and the plaintiffs claim. 110 To apply
this test to federal quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction derived from a Rule
B attachment, the court must know whether the state or the entire United
States is the territorial limit of the forum. The larger the territory of the
forum, the greater the number of contacts between the defendant and the
forum. These can then be aggregated before applying the Shaffer test, and
consequently the test will be easier to satisfy.
1. The United States as the Proper Forum
To determine the proper forum for applying the minimum contacts test
in the admiralty context, the Selene court, because of the lack of precedent
in the field, was forced to look for guidance to other branches of federal
jurisdiction."' Relying on a line of cases involving federal question juris-
diction,"12 the court adopted the concept of aggregating the contacts be-
tween the defendant and the entire United States to evaluate the sufficiency
of contact under the Shaffer test.' 1 3
There are two problems with this approach. First, even the federal
question cases that advocated the use of the entire United States as the
proper forum in the minimum contacts test did not allow such aggre-
gation of contacts in the absence of specific statutory authorization." 4
Thus, the application of the Shaffer standard to admiralty jurisdiction
would delineate only the constitutional boundaries of jurisdictional due
process." 5 The defendant must also be subject to service of process by the
110. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
111. 446 F. Supp. at 709.
112. Id at 709 nn.11 & 12.
113. Id at 709.
114. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977)
(trademark infringement); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2
(7th Cir. 1975) (patent infringement) (question need not be reached); Moriarty & Co. v. Gen-
eral Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (Sherman Act violations).
115. See, ag., Note, supra note 4, 56 TEx. L. REv. at 1117-18.
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forum seeking to assert jurisdiction over him." 6 Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules, which governs service of process in admiralty actions, limits such
service to the territory of the state in which the district court sits, 11 7 absent
an applicable state long-arm statute" 18 or federal statute." 19 Since no fed-
eral statute allows nationwide service of process in admiralty actions, such
service is restricted to the territory of the state or the territorial scope of a
state long-arm statute. Unless service of process in a particular case may be
obtained under a nationwide state long-arm statute, which would extend
service to its constitutional limit,' 20 the district court hearing the admiralty
claim could not assert its jurisdiction to the constitutional boundary embod-
ied in the Shaffer standard. Therefore, the use of the entire United States
as the proper forum in the minimum contacts test would be constitutionally
invalid.121
A second problem with the Selene court's aggregation formula is that it
exceeds the scope of Shaffer. For example, if an alien defendant conducts
negligible amounts of business in each of the eastern seaboard states, the
aggregation of these contacts under the Selene approach could conceivably
satisfy the Shaffer test. The defendant could then be called upon to defend
himself in an area, such as the Western District of Washington, in which he
has property subject to attachment but no contacts, thereby suffering the
very unfairness the Shaffer test seeks to avoid. As the Selene court
noted,' 22 a transfer of the case to another district under the venue provi-
sions 123 would alleviate some of this unfairness but, especially when the
defendant's U.S. dealings are scattered, some unfairness will remain.
Whether this factor alone should produce dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Shaffer would depend on the court's evaluation of the
reasonableness of its assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant. 124
2. The State as the Proper Forum
A better approach, at least until Congress authorizes nationwide serv-
ice of process in admiralty suits, is to use the state in which the district court
hearing the plaintiffs claim is located as the proper forum. This would only
permit the aggregation of the defendant's contacts with any part of that
116. Id
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
120. See Note, supra note 4, 56 TEx. L. REv. at 1119.
121. Since the Selene court did not mention any such authority for serving process on the
defendants, the result of the case may well be invalid.
122. 446 F. Supp. at 710.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
124. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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state before applying the Shaffer test. Because the forum's territory would
be smaller than under the Selene court's approach, there would be situa-
tions in which the two approaches would yield different results.
For example, an alien shipper might conduct a small amount of busi-
ness in each of the states on the eastern seaboard. Aggregation under the
Selene approach, adding together all of these contacts, might suffice to meet
the Shaffer test, and subject the defendant to suit in any district in which
venue lies. The state-forum approach, however, would preclude aggrega-
tion among the several states involved and, without aggregation, the indi-
vidual defendant-state contacts might be insufficient to satisfy the Shaffer
test. Thus, at first glance, a Rule B attachment could not constitutionally
provide jurisdiction over this defendant despite his several contacts with the
United States as a whole. Would this approach be so restrictive as to im-
munize an alien defendant from suit, even for serious transgressions? 25
The answer is a qualified no.
First, if such suits arise from the defendant's activities within the state,
e.g., breaching a contract negotiated and partly performed within the state,
this close relationship between the in-state activity and the origin of the
plaintiff's claim may well satisfy the minimum contacts test and allow the
assertion of jurisdiction.' 26 Second, if such suits arise other than through
the defendant's activities within the state, the plaintiff can raise a "jurisdic-
tion by necessity" argument to bring this assertion of jurisdiction within
constitutional boundaries.' 27 Third, use of the state as the proper forum in
the Shaffer test is in accordance with the statewide scope of service of proc-
ess under the Federal Rules.I28 Fourth, the Shaffer Court intended the min-
imum contacts test to impose restrictions on the availability of quasi in rem
jurisdiction when necessary to prevent unfairness to the defendant.' 29
Thus, denial of such jurisdiction in some cases is a predictable, intended
result of the Shaffer test130 and cannot also provide an argument against
the narrowing of quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction.
Although some difference of opinion exists as to the proper forum for
the Shaffer test, use of the state rather than the entire United States appears
to be the best choice at this time. Critics will stress the restrictive nature of
this approach while its adherents can point to the impropriety of the Selene
court's solution. Clearly, the issue remains open, and no doubt further judi-
125. See Note, supra note 4, 56 TEX. L. REv. at 1117.
126. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text.
129. 433 U.S. at 209.
130. Id
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cial elucidation can be expected. It is far easier, however, to determine
what type of contacts might satisfy the Shaffer test in the admiralty context.
- C. SATISFYING THE SHAFFER TEST IN THE ADMIRALTY CONTEXT
The Shaffer test requires the existence of sufficient minimum contacts
among the defendant, forum, and litigation to make the forum's assertion
of jurisdiction over the defendant fair and reasonable under the circum-
stances.' 31 Assertions of in rem and some types of quasi in rem 132 admi-
ralty jurisdiction will almost always satisfy this test because of the close
relationship between the property involved and the claim being litigated. 133
Situations that give rise to a "jurisdiction by necessity" argument will also,
for the most part, allow the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction over an
alien defendant. 134 The majority of quasi in rem admiralty cases, however,
will require close analysis of the facts to determine whether the Shaffer test
is satisfied.
The analysis under the Shaffer test of the reasonableness of the court's
assertion of jurisdiction involves the evaluation of four principal factors.
First, the court must decide whether the defendant's activities within the
forum are "continuous and systematic" or "single or isolated."' 135 Second,
the court should examine whether the plaintiff's claim is related to the de-
fendant's activities within the forum.' 36 Third, the court will evaluate the
inconvenience that the defendant would suffer in defending a suit brought
in the particular forum.' 37 Fourth, the court must determine whether the
defendant's activities in the forum enabled it to enjoy the "benefits and
protection" of the forum's laws. 138 By themselves, these factors add little
substance to the Shaffer analysis, but their interpretation by the courts 139
should establish some guidelines for the type of contacts that will satisfy the
Shaffer test in the admiralty context.
The mere fact that the defendant corporation is chartered by the
state in which the district court hearing the claim sits will be of great signifi-
131. 433 U.S. at 203-04.
132. See notes 35-36 supra.
133. 433 U.S. at 207-08.
134. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
135. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945).
136. Id at 319.
137. Id at 317-19.
138. Id at 319.
139. Under the old two-pronged test, courts applied these same criteria in the "jurisdic-
tional" prong. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. These decisions as to what type of
activities within the forum will satisfy the International Shoe test (the core of the Shaffer test)
should furnish useful guidelines as to the type of activities that may satisfy the Shaffer test and
allow quasi in rem jurisdiction to be exercised over a nonresident defendant.
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cance 140 and might be enough to satisfy the test.' 4 1 The existence within the
forum of an office of the defendant shipowner or stevedoring company
could also suffice.' 42 In the absence of such an office, conduct of regular
loading, unloading, or transport operations within the forum might meet
the constitutional requirement. 43 If the defendant is too small a shipowner
to conduct regular business within the forum on a large scale, employment
of what assets he does possess within the forum in a purposeful way or with
a business motive could satisfy Shaffer. 44 And even if the defendant has
no office or agent within the forum and his vessels only rarely enter its
waters, the court may constitutionally exercise its jurisdiction over him if
the claim being litigated arose directly from activities of the defendant
while in the forum. 45 No doubt courts faced with post-Shaffer challenges
to quasi in rem jurisdiction based on maritime attachment will elucidate
further useful guidelines.
CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction based on a
Rule B attachment should be evaluated under the Shaffer test. The argu-
ment that the autonomy of admiralty, fixed on the face of the Constitution
and in the early procedural statutes, is still of sufficient force to escape the
jurisdictional due process standard of Shaffer must fail in the light of later
developments, reflected in the 1966 merger of common law/equity and ad-
miralty procedure.
The applicability of Shaffer does not spell the end of the use of mari-
time attachment as a jurisdictional device. When, for example, the plaintiff
has a preexisting interest in the attached property, Shaffer's effect will be
minimal. If the plaintiff can show the lack of any other forum, this also
might allow jurisdiction on the basis of the attachment of property. More
importantly, the position taken in Feder and Selene, distinguishing between
140. D/S A/S Flint v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 228 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), a f'd ub
nom. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1965).
141. Chilean Line, Inc. v. United States, 344 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1965); Nea Armonia Ship-
ping Co., Ltd. v. Antco Shipping, Ltd., 409 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
142. Antco Shipping Co. v. Yukon Compania Naviera, S.A., 318 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Federazione Italiana dei Consorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania de Vapores, S.A., 158
F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
143. D/S A/S Flint v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 228 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), adff dub
nom. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1965).
144. Federazione Italiana dei Consorzi Agrari v. Mandask Compania de Vapores, S.A., 158
F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
145. Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosanas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965); Seawind Compania, S.A.
v. Crescent Line, Inc., 320 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1963); Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd. v. MS Galini,
323 F. Supp. 79 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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the property of a nonresident defendant that warns its owner by its very
nature of its potential involvement in litigation and that which does not,
may open a large hole in the Shaffer test through which many maritime
attachments may pass.
Important questions await answers from the courts as they apply the
Shaffer test to quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction. The most important of
these is the choice of the proper forum to be used in the Shaffer test. Ulti-
mately, this question may be answered by Congress if the legislators pro-
vide for nationwide service of process in admiralty actions. Until that time,
the courts should use a statewide forum as they explore the ramifications of
applying the Shaffer test to quasi in rem admiralty jurisdiction.
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